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THE ROLE OF ETHNIC MAPPING IN NATION­BUILDING
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL DECISION­MAKING
ACROSS THE BALKAN PENINSULA (1840s–1910s)
Abstract: Beyond highlighting the role and functions of ethnic maps of the Balkan Peninsula in
the 19thcentury in the context of the emerging, nationalist ideology (1); this article tries to draw
attention to some misinterpretations or abuses made intentionally by cartographers, (2) by
comparing the original datasets with the officially published and reinterpreted tables found in the
HHStA (2a), and by comparing the western and eastern and Balkan cartographic practices and
visualization methods (2b). All these could lead to different interpretations (not to mention the
different interpretations of the terms used to denote the same nation), which made ethnic maps
adequateinstrumentstoadvocatethenationalidea, turningthemfromascientificmethod(thematic
mapping) toa political tool of creatingthenation (instead of depicting it). Ourcase studies examine
(a) whether the first­generation ethnic patch maps depicted the situation in the Balkans better, or
the reinterpreted modern pie­chart maps are more appropriate to illustrate ethnic diversity; (b)
whether Ottoman data are completely unreliable or they could serve as a basis of ethnic mapping;
(c) whethertheinvestigatedOttomandatafrom the1830sandthe1870swereavailable to western
cartographersatallornotandhowdataweredistorted;and(d) whethertherewereanymapsbased
onOttoman data that reached the level of decision­makers and how this related to other, western
map constructions. We also compare the features of nationalist and imperial ethnic cartography,
the language­centric and religiocentric approach and the differences between these approaches,
and finally we also try to offer a rather limited method of how to mutually control the reliability of
sources producedby competing parties (onthe example of Ottoman and Exarchist data).
Keywords: ethnic mappingtechniques, Balkans, Ottomans, Exarchate, Kiepert, Teplov, Boué.
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The 19th century brought about significant changes in hearts andminds. It was the
age of the national revival,1 culminating in the fight between the traditional concept
of the state nation (empire) and the new idea of the nation state. The adoption of
Darwinismandterms such as the “competition of races”, or“natural selection” in social
science and history resulted in a new and teleological concept, which claimed that
there was a natural evolution trend towards the nation and nation states, and these
were also considered the most developed social formations and political entities. This
also implied that the struggle for survival or competition between the nations was a
natural phenomenon. Nationalism, as a political movement, also utilized this concept,
when it articulated to unite everyone belonging to the same nation into a single state
with “natural boundaries”,2 propagating the emergence of the nation state versus
empires, considering the latter an obsolete formation.3
A new ideology always needs new argumentation to legitimize its existence and
aspirations, and it also requires new instruments to serve these arguments. Among
these one can find ethnic mapping, which is considered a special method of nation­
building. Together with the fabrication of the historical past (a task left to historians),
ethnic mapping (a task designated for geographers and cartographers) was an
excellent instrument to advertise national goals and desires (even to externalize
internal problems), as maps were cheaper than establishing or maintaining schools,
while being able to influence minds through their visibility and publicity. For instance,
1000 copies of the same map cost 2000 francs,4 and from this amount all Greek
schools in Macedonia could
be
supplied with effective propaganda material.
Compared to other instruments andmethods to spread nationalist propaganda, maps
could be produced, reproduced and disseminated easily.5 Though map­reading also
requires some skills (reading pamphlets also required these), teachers could easily
transmit the message of maps to “illiterate” masses. Furthermore, paintings (ethnic
maps can also be interpreted in such way) are more easily perceived by the human
1
4
See the terms like “Risorgimento”, “Vazrazhdane”, etc.
2 Not in physical­geographicalterms (this does not refer to mountain chains and watersheds),
but in the political­geographical sense.
3 Nationalism becameoneof the main driving forces in the struggle for independence besides
social argumentation (oppression) and the economic criticism of the financial efficiency of
the Ottoman Empire (the lack of transparency, lack of local utilization of sources).





Issue, 1879–1912, Part 2, 1905–1912, Edited by Tokay, Gül and Küneralp, Sinan, Isis Press,
Istanbul 2011, Nr. 1426, 15, Nov. 1906.
The cheapest rifle (another adequate instrument to exert pressure on minds), an obsolete
Werndl, was 6 francs at the time, while a good Martini cost 10–15 pounds sterling (220–300
francs). ODD, IV/1, Nr. 357 (1902). By comparison, the annual expenses of the Greek lycée
in Saloniki were 70,000 francs, while the Greek government supported the educational and
other efforts of the Patriarchate with 1.5 million francs a year. Ipek Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties:
Religion, Violence and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908, Cornell
Univ. 2013, 66, 71–78.
5
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mindthanprinted texts.6 Thisgivesanadvantagetomapscomparedtoothercompressed
forms of knowledge, such as book reviews, which have the same functions.7 The
organization supporting Hellenes and Hellenization in Macedonia, the Syllogos, was also
aware of these advantages, when it decided to order a Pro­Greek “ethnocratic” ethnic
map from Kiepert and to disseminate it in all Greek schools of Macedonia, thereby
diminishingtheunfavourableeffectofKiepert’sformermap(1876).Nevertheless, this case
illustrates that mapscouldhavedifferent target groups, frommasses todecision­makers,8
and that maps could also serve as propaganda material besides being instruments of
planning.It also highlights thateventhesameauthorproducedcontradictorymaps,which
questioned the scientific credibility of ethnic mapping in general(Map 1–2).
Maps could also carry a special message beyond their original “content”. This
often led to misinterpretations. In Croatia the cadastral land surveys in connection
with the planned tax reforms in 1883 resulted in an anti­modernist mass movement
and the burning
of
cadastral and other maps as a protest against government
measures.9 Heremaps symbolized the centralizing state power, andthe Croatian case
is a good example to prove Anderson’s concept about the general role and function
of maps.10 The vast Hungarian cartographic material in the Paris Exhibition in 1900
also confirms the idea that maps also function as representations.11
Ethnic maps became the key means
of
not only visualizing, but also of inventing
andpromoting the national thought.12 Not only politicians, but contemporary scholars
also recognised and accepted this ambivalent relationship between ethnic mapping
and politics,13 though 19th century proponents still considered the former a scientific
7
8
6 In the 20th century, 90% of the stimuliwere visual. School statistics in favor of theGreekswere
initially published in the form of statistical tables, but were soon visualized as the visual
impact of a map is usually stronger. See
I.
Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties, 98.
Pregled geografske literature o Balkanskom poluostrvu, edited by Jovan Cvijić. Volume 4 of
this series contains the excerpts of more than 140 works from 1898–1900, of which only
33% related to natural sciences (geology, meteorology and physical geography), while all
the other targeted human geography or mapping.
See: Harley “Maps, knowledge, and power”, in: G. L. Henderson, M. Waterstone, Geographic
Thought: A Praxis Perspective. Routledge, 277–278.
9HR­HDA­Pr.Zv.(Hrvatskidržavniarhiv,PredsjedništvoZemaljskevlade)78.fond,181.box:63356/1883.
10 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections
on
the Origin and Spread
of
Nationalism, Verso, London–New York (2006, revised edition), Chapter 10, 163–187.
11 While the accounts in the other 28 countries’ mapswere not longer than a paragraph each,
the list of Hungarian maps constituted more than two pages, the second longest
enumeration after Russia. The maps represented the tremendous civilizational activity of
the central power in discovering, regulating, ruling and transformingthe landscape. Veronika
Eszik, A magyar–horvát tengermellék mint nemzetiesített táj. Adalék az intézményesülő
földrajztudomány és a nemzetépítés kapcsolatához, Korall 16, no. 62 (2018) 77–78.
12 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities.
13 This relationship between the state and humanities was not considered unnatural at the
time. This is the era of nationalized science, when the task of certain disciplineswas to secure
cohesive forces for the society (nation).
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method.14 The fact that ethnic maps were used for propaganda purposes
overshadowing scientific concerns – a demonstration in Greece in 1903 demanded a
ban on maps that were unfavourable for the Greek cause and even urged for a
governmental counter­offensive15 – has determined the status of ethnic mapping up
to now, degrading it froma positivistic methodof the era of the “nationalized science”
(the 19th century) to a suspicious, opportunistic practice.
As ethnic mapping is not purely a scientific method, but a propaganda material
and an instrument of nation­making, the various interpretations can be very
misleading and dangerous. (1) Recent works in East­Central and Southeast Europe
still vindicate the importance of old ethnic maps,16 considering them not only political
material, but scientifically established works. (2) The methodological mistakes
committed by the 19th century cartographers recur in modern works and the
application of old, fuzzy categories is still observable.17
Map 1. A simplified sketch map on the evolution of Cvijić’s ideas
regarding the ethnic picture of the Balkans (redrawn after Wilkinson)
14
15
I. Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties, 88. Though opportunistic tendencies are not negligible, there was
a firm belief that ethnographic maps promoted “justice” and “development”.
I. Yosmaoğlu, Blood ties, 94.
16 See the ethnic map in: Georgi Markov, Bulgariya i Balkanskiya sayuz sreshtu Osmanskata
Imperiya, 1911–1913, Izd. Zahariy Stoyanov, Sofia 2012.
17 Mustafa
M.
Kruja, Ne historine Shqiptare, OMSCA­1, Tirana 2012 (recent reprint or
posthumouswork of an Albanian minister). Pál Fodor, Kisebbségek azOszmán Birodalomban.
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Map 2a. Variations on the same topic: the ethnic map of Kiepert handed
at the Berlin Congress (above) and the ethnocratic map of the same author
ordered by the Greek propaganda (below)
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Map 2b. Variations of the same topic: the ethnic map of Kiepert handed
at the Berlin Congress (above) and the ethnocratic map of the same author
ordered by the Greek propaganda (below)
The goal of this study is partly to reveal some tendencies of manipulations in the
past, through some examples. In doing so we tried to collect and evaluate ethnic data
(includingsomeunpublishedmanuscripts), censusmethodsand visualizationtechniques
inorderto comparethemand check their relevance.These all point to thefact thatdata
14–20. sz. [Minorities in the Ottoman Empire], História 34, no. 8 (2012) 30–34. See the map
by Béla Nagy on page 33, showing the Muslim relative majority in each vilayet, because
Christians were splintered among the “newborn” nations.
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integrity and reliability in the 19th century Balkans were weak. But while the inherent
obscurity of ethnic categories (such as “Bulgarian”)18 is hardly eliminable by any map
editors, methodological mistakes of visualization could have been avoided. And if these
mistakesareabundant, itmeansthattheethnicmapsoftheinvestigatederadidnotmeet
the standards of contemporary science from the methodological point of view (as they
could have been designed/visualized better). In other words, if even those parts of the
workwerenotcarriedoutbyapplying a professionalapproach,thatcouldhavebeendone
anyway, it implies that scientific criteria were simplysubjectedto other(political) goals.19
That is whywedecided to deconstruct the old ethnographic patch maps into their
building bricks (data) and then to rebuild them using a different visualization method







proportions.20 We went down even to the manuscript level, if available, using the
archives of HHStA and CDA (Sofia). In order to make maps comparable with each
other, a similar scaling, projection system and legends were used.
The idea to compare maps based on the same (or similar) data, but using a
different visualization technique, came from the observation that the first
ethnographic patch maps (Boué, 1847, or Šafaryk, Map 3)21 neglected the illustration
of Muslims; however, recent literature puts their share in the Balkans to 30–45%,
relying on – partly deficient – 18th century defters.22 Illustrating the raw data of the
first Ottoman census (1830s) in pie­chart maps (Map 4), the picture we obtained was
significantly different from that of these western patch maps,23 and the results
20
18 Should this term include Pomaksand Slavic­speaking patriarchists, or not? This would largely
influence the results. The competing Balkan nations did not agree as to what „Bulgarian”
meant; in other words not only did different ethnic categories exist, but even numerous
approaches coexisted for the same term, further diversifying the palette.
19We leave to other historians to discuss these in detail.
Pie­chart maps are better if the goal is the illustration of the heterogeneity or population
numbers or population density, while this map­type is inapt to delimit boundaries or
homogeneous territories. For the latter purpose usually patch maps were used in the
investigated time period, but they distorted ethnic proportions and numbers.
21Lejean(1861)andHabenichtwerethefirstwhotriedtoillustrateMuslimswithpatches.Thishappened
notearlierthantheCrimeanWar(whentheOttomanEmpirebecameanallyofthePowersfirstinthe
19th century), so politicalcircumstanceshada non­negligibleinfluenceonmappingpractices.
Anton Minkov, Conversion to Islam in the Balkans: Kisve Bahasi Petitions and Ottoman Social Life
1670–1730,Brill,Leiden2004.Seealso:BruceMcGowan,EconomicLifeinOttomanEurope.Taxation,
TradeandtheStruggle for Land, 1600–1800, Cambridge University Press,NewYork 1981,80–114.
23 Three reasons can explain the difference between the maps. First, the Ottoman census
distortsinfavouroftheMuslims, thereforeearly mappers,beingawareof this fact,refrainedfrom
usingOttomandata. Second, theywereunable toobtainthecensusdata(ofcourse,thisraises the
question as towhat extent these maps can be considered scientific products, and theanswer
is unfavourable – see Justin McCarthy’s criticism of westernmappers). Third, they considered
their maps as tools to highlight a problem (that millions of Christians live under Ottoman
rule) – hence the overemphasis on the Christian/Slavic character of the peninsula. In the
latter case, the scientific character of ethnic mapping can be questioned ab ovo.
22
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basically confirmed the stance of 18th century cizye defters. The comparison of the
pie chart map based on the 1831 census data with pie chart maps created from the
data of the next census (1870s, Map 5) denied the presumption that Ottoman data
were completely useless. In other words, if numbers are not correct, then at least
ethnic proportions are correct in the 1831dataset or–not worse than in later statistics
based on a more precise approach! Thus our pie charts relying on the original Ottoman
data still offer a more realistic picture than the first generation of western patch maps.
Map 3. A patch map of the early era neglecting Muslims of the Balkans (Boué, 1847)
64
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To sum up, if the two visualization methods (pie chart and patch maps) show a
similar picture (outlook), this means that the results are independent from the method,
thus old maps can be considered reliable. If the results differ from each other, this
means that either distortions or intentional manipulation occurred during the process
of visualization, which questions the reliability of the map. And if we compare the
original patch maps of Gopčević with the pie­chart variant (Map 6), or the material
found in HHStA, Nachlass Szapáry and Nachlass Kral24 (patch maps, redrawn in pie
chart forms), the differences between the two methods of illustration are evident.
Nonetheless, the outlined method(comparing patchmaps and pie­chart variants)
is only able to handle cartographic problems – those arising during the visualization
process. However, unintentional distortions and intentional manipulations mayoccur
not only during visualization, but even at the level of applied categories (depending
onthe interpretation of the “nation”) and at the level of numbers too. The manuscripts
found in HHStA, or the automatic reclassification of Macedonians into Bulgarians in
Austrian practice is an evident example of this problem (Table 1).
Table 1. Differences between the published data and the original manuscript on the
ethnic pattern of the Balkans I.
Official appendix of an Austrian ethnic map:
Jews Total
3600




Janina 450 800 77,700 6,000 6,400 1,000
Leskovic 11,000 5,000 4,000 1,000
Konica 1,200 12,600 4,000 200
Filat 12,000 9,000 6,000 1,000
Ajdonat 5,000 5,000 5,000 800
Metsovo 850 4,700 50
Statistische daten über Nationalitaten und Religionen in Makedonien.








24 For the original Austrian patch maps and the redrawn pie­chart maps see: Gábor Demeter,
Krisztián Csaplár­Degovics, Zsolt Bottlik, Етническите карти и статистики като
политическа реклама и инструменти за изграждане
на
нация (1878–1913) –
надеждност на данните, Makedonski pregled 39, no. 2 (2016) 47–82.
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Jews Total
Original manuscript in HHStA, Wien (same area):




Janina 4,500 4,400 81,000 12,000
Leskovic 8,000 5,800 1,000 200
Konica 2,000 2,000 15,000 5,800
Filat 1,000 1,000 5,000









HHStA, Wien, PA XII. Kt. 273. Compiled from the reports of Pára, Ippen and Kral.
The modern nation state tried to get rid of the fuzzy or multiple identity forms
that do not fit into the imagined schemes – with the aid of censuses and ethnic maps
– by overemphasizing one selected element of the multidimensional identity.25 Thus
ethnographic maps usually offered a restricted/limited or specific interpretation of
the nation. In fact, ethnographic maps contributed to the creation of the modern
nations by flattening the dimensions of identity, rather than to depict them properly.
This resulted in contradictory maps using the same raw data (Map 6–7). Contrary to
the practices of nation states, the imperial mapping of Austria­Hungary refused these
homogenization techniques for political reasons and, instead, a multidimensional
classification was used to depict the situation in the Balkans.
Map 6. The difference between pie­chart maps and patch maps (as techniques of
illustration) based on the same dataset (Gopčević, 1889)
25 See also B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, Chapter 10, 163–187.
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Map 7. Variations on the same topic: completely different ethnic pie­chart maps of the contested
Macedonian region created from the data and patch maps of pro­Serb Gopčević (1889),
Greek Nikolaides (1899) and Bulgarian Ivanov (1912)
During the Great Eastern Crisis several ethnic maps were created that showed all
the symptoms and problems discussed above. One of the most famous maps is the
ethnic map of Heinrich Kiepert, which served as the basis for decision­making in
Berlin. However, (1) it was not the only variant depicting his views (Map 2); (2) his
views were exposed to severe criticism and (3) there were also other authors who
used different methods supporting one of the Powers’s concepts. In the following
lines we try to analyze them in a case study.
Kiepert’s map26 was based on the data of Sax, Jireček, Kanitz, Bradaška and Jakšić,
and he made use of the map of Lejean and Hahn. Although his map (Map 2) became
famous as the one used at the Berlin Congress, the polyglot Hungarian geographer
(and Turcophile turanist) Béla Erődi­Harrach criticized its concept in early 1876,27
claiming that there were many mistakes in the map. His thesis was that the religion
for Muslims was still a stronger marker of identity than ethnicity defined by the
spoken language: a Bosniak or Pomak would rather choose the Ottoman Empire and
Turks (considering them their real compatriots) over their Slavic­speaking brethren.
Thus the overemphasis of language in Kiepert’s map as the maindeterminative factor
of ethnicity has a diminishing effect on the Muslim character of the Empire.28
26
Kiepert was taught by historians Ranke and Meinecke, and workedtogether with Karl Ritter,
the founder of modern geography. Thus, the intertwining of these two disciplines – both
often accused of political motivations and inclinations – was characteristic of his career.
27 Béla Erődi, Kartografia (Ethnographische Übersichtskarte des Europäischen Orients), Földrajzi
Közlemények 4 (1876) 341–344.
28 Béla Erődi, Földrajzi és népismei tanulmányaim európai Törökországban az 1869‐iki felvétel
alkalmával, Földrajzi Közlemények 2 (1874).
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As we mentioned, Kiepert soon revised his ideas due to the Greek pressure and
his “ethnocratic” map29 was in complete contrast to the cartographer’s formerwork.
However, it was not only Kiepert in that era who created a map directly to support
decision­making. The Russian Teplov’s map (Map 8) was also more than political
propaganda or the expression of sympathy towards one of the races in the Ottoman
Empire, as it functioned as an aide‐material in the conference of Constantinople to
promote Russian interests. But it was completely different from Kiepert’s map. First,
it was a choropleth map illustrating two groups at the same time, indicating the
proportions with colour tones. Second, it contained religious and not ethnic
classification.30 Third, it also indicated the population number (males, in fact), which
patch maps failed to do. So, Teplov’s map was methodologically more sophisticated
than Kiepert’s, despite its numerous mistakes (see later). Teplov’s map did not distort
the relations radically in favour of Christians in Bulgaria (especially if we compare it
to the suggested preliminary boundaries of Bulgaria), and he did not claim that the
new state would be dominantly Bulgarian – contrary to what some language­based
patch maps (the map of Kiepert) would suggest.
Compared to this, Kiepert’s map (speaking of visualization techniques) was
methodologically less elaborated.The cross­hatching, applied by him, also cameunder
criticism for not being able to illustrate ethnic proportions, not to mentionthefact that
he ignored to indicate 309 thousand Muslim Bosniaks, the 250 thousand Circassians
between Niš and Kosovo and the 485 thousand Muslims of Macedonia (many were
incorporated into the Slavic ethnic group in his map based on their spoken language).
What Erődi offered – relying onOttoman ethnoreligious categories (millets) –was
also not a viable option. The combination of the linguistic and ethnoreligious
categories was also attempted, but as Cvijić wrote, “Sax’s Austrian bureaucratism
tore nations into atoms”.Up to then ethnic maps favouring one particular group were
the “norm”,31 but, with the advent of Sax, the Macedonian “ethnic salad” was
invented in maps – and Austria­Hungary would continue to use this approach in the
future for its own political reasons.
Besides the visualization problems and the question of data interpretation (how
to create ethnic categories from ethnoreligious groups), the third key problem is the
statistics – the problem of basic data. Regarding the number of Christians, one cannot
decide which source is more reliable: Teplov’s dataset relying on the Exarchate’s data
from 1877, or his map created for the conference in Constantinople or the Ottoman
census. Therefore, wecarried out two experiments: (1) first, to examine the problem
29 Tableau Ethnocratique des pays du sud‐est
de
l’Europe, Berlin 1878.
30 Though inanother material Teplov also tried to give ethnic data, like Kiepert, at least for the
Bulgarians, using the census of the Exarchate, neither showed an overwhelming Bulgarian
majority, while a huge number of non­exarchist Christians were also indicated. In the
material from the Exarchate the number and proportion of Muslims were too small
compared to other western and Ottoman statistics.
It
is not surprising that this data series
was not used in Constantinople, but the other one based on the Ottoman census of 1873!
B. Yosmaoğlu, Blood Ties, 94.
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more reliable. For the first experiment we used the 1831 census data. For the second
experiment, a comparative analysis of the ethno­demographic characteristics of the
Danube vilayet was carried out, using four different datasets.32
In order to find an answer to the first question, the kaza­level data of the census
in 1831 were mapped using the pie­chart method, and the results were compared to
the map based on the data of the 1870s (using the data published in the Extrait
du
Courrier d’Orientand some Ottoman salname). The hypothesis is the following: if the
ethnic proportions are quite similar (there were no significant wars, expulsions,
though the administrative division probably changed), it means that the two millets
were treated in the same way in the Ottoman census. What is evident comparing
Map 4 and 5 is that – while the size (representing the number of the census
population) of the pie charts is inconsequent, the ethnoreligious proportions seem to
bestable in thistime interval! In otherwords, onemaycometothe conclusion thatnone
of the two millets were more underrepresented in Ottoman statistics than the other.33
Forthesecondexperiment,weusedthe article oftheEncyclopaediaBritannica (1876),
Aubaret’s and St. Claire’s statistics and Ottoman statistics published by Ismail Kemal in
the Danube (Dunav) newspaper (Table 2). The latter was compared to the detailed
statistics of Teplov (1876), and Stavrides, Jocelyn and Cherkassky (all prior to 1877, but
thesearebasedonethnoreligious andnotethnic categories)(Table 3–4).Thegoalwasto
identify the direction of the information flow and the accompanying distortions.
Despite the similarity of total numbers, the four estimations of the Danube vilayet
are different (the proportion of Bulgarians varied between 50 and 63%, their number
is rated between 1.1 and 1.5 million). Some data suggest (Armenian Christians) that
St. Clair and the Danube newspaper used a common source, but reclassed the data
differently: the former used ethnic, the latter social categories (settlers and
established). The source might
be
the Ottoman Tahrir­i Cedid from 1874.34 The
Encyclopaedia Britannica also used a different source anda reclassification completely
based on ethnic terms. All the other western estimations of Jocelyn, the English
tercüman Stavrides and Russian prince Cherkassky correspond to the data of the
Ottoman data series in general. Both the proportions and the numbers are similar.
Differences may be explained by the application of different multiplicators (to count
the total population, different multiplicators were used for Ottomans and
Christians),35 or by the selection of different Ottoman sources.
32 The selection of the location was reasoned by the fact that after the census in the 1830s, the
first modern Ottoman census was carried out in the Danube vilayet in 1866. See: Aşkın
Koyuncu, Tuna vilâyeti’nde nüfus ve demografi (1864–1877), Turkish Studies 9, no. 4 (2014)
675–737.
33 There are only some exceptions such as Ihtiman, where the proportions are switched,
probably due to a mistake.
A. Koyuncu, Tuna vilâyeti’nde nüfus ve demografi.
35 Muslimsweresupposedto live in smaller households, butthiswasnotthecasewithall districts.
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Table 2. Four different statistics on the ethnoreligious composition of the Danube Vilayet
Total population of the Danube Vilayet







Male population of the Danube Vilayet
(excluding Niş sanjak) in 1866–1873




Established Muslims 392,369 (34%)
Muslim settlers 64,398 (6%)






other Christians 40,303 (4%)
JEWS 5,375 (0%)
NON­MUSLIM Gypsies 7,663 (1%)
Population









Male Population of the Danube Vilayet(including Niş) in 1876 according to Ottomanofficer Saint Clair Total population of the Danube Vilayet
(including Niş and Sofia sanjaks) according to
the 1876 edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica:
Group Population Group Population
MUSLIMS Bulgarians 1,500,000 (63%)
Turk Muslims 457,018 (36%) Turks 500,000 (21%)
Other Muslims 104,639 (8%) Tatars 100,000 (4%)
Gypsies 8,220 (1%) Circassians 90,000 (4%)
NON‐MUSLIMS Albanians 70,000 (3%)





Bulgarian Christians 639,813 (50%) Russians 10,000 (0%)




Аркадиев, Димитър: Изменения в броя на населението по българските земи в състава




The Role of Ethnic Mapping in Nation­Building and Its Influence
on Political Decision­Making Across the Balkan Peninsula (1840s–1910s)








352 251 58 371 233 60Rusçuk
Vidin 70 314 18 60 266+31 17
Varna 89 35 71 120 37+15 69
150 231 39 199 301 40Tırnova
Tulça
Sofia
109 84 56 92 22+40 60
48 292 14 63 328 16
Total 818 1,207 40 41










Cherkassky(M) Cherkassky(B) Cherkassky(M%) Teplov Teplov Teplov(M%) Muslims, Christians, Muslim
(M) (non­M) 1874/75 1874/75 %
Rusçuk 381 233 61 268 290 48 190 119 61
Vidin 60 246+31 18 40 333 11 30 149 17
Varna 120 43+9 70 64 45 59 60 26 70
190 300 38 68 328 17 95 150 39Tırnova
Tulça 112 26+39 63 103 116 47 56 31 64
Sofia 60 362 14 58 429 12 30 183 14
Total 923 1,310 41 601 1,541 28 461 658
4
1
Niş 78 270 22 72 360 17
1874 only males
Data from: Koyuncu, Tuna vilâyeti”nde nüfus
ve
demografi. Jocelyn’s data are lower,
because they refer to the 1873 or pre­1873 Ottoman salname, which gave a different number
compared to subsequent sources.
Table 4. Differences between Teplov’s two datasets
Muslims Non­Muslims Total Muslims in %
1,694 1,976 3,670 46%English consulates (total population)Tep ov, 1876/77 (to al po ulation)v II (males, Map)
1,057 2,745 3,802 28%
715 1,175 1,890 38%
Data from: Turan, Ömer: The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria (1878–1908). Ankara: Türk Tarih
Kurumu, 1998. Including the Niş sanjak and Eastern Rumelia.
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As already stated, Teplov provided two, completely different data series regarding
numbers and percentages. The one, giving higher numbers (indicating the total
population), did not correspond to the western data series of Jocelyn, Cherkassky
and Stavrides and thus to the 1874 Ottoman source. Teplov gives the lowest number
and proportion for the Muslims (cca. 30%). Relying on the Exarchate’s statistics he
calculated with only 1.05–1.3 million Bulgarians, which means that their proportion
remained under 50% and this also implied that there were at least one million non­
exarchist Christians in his statistics living in Greater Bulgaria.
The above mentioned dataset of Teplov
is
not identical with that he prepared for
the conference in Constantinople. For this he provided another data series –and this
implicitly means that he considered the latter more reliable or unchallengeable.36 The
question is how the two data series related to each other. Accepting Teplov’s first
(Exarchist) statistics would imply that Ottomans were able to count Exarchist
Bulgarians properly (their data are close to each other both in Ottoman and Exarchist
sources), but were incapable of counting hundreds of thousands of other Orthodox
people, which is implausible.37
Though the aggregated numbers in his dataset indicating the total population are
twice as high as in the other one (1.8 million males vs. 3.8 million inhabitants in
Bulgaria, Niš and Eastern Rumelia), a detailed analysis confirms that it is not the result
of multiplying the number of males by 2. So, it is evident that the two data series
were based on two different sources.
The comparative analysis proves that Teplov in his second data series used the
ethnoreligious data of the Ottoman registers from 1873 and 1874. A serious mistake
made in his mapconfirms this. The 1874 salname erroneously registered the Christian
population of the Sofia sanjak in the Muslim column (and theMuslims were indicated
as Christians), but only here. As it was well known that Sofia had a Christian majority,
Teplov tried to figure out new values for the Christians to gain the Christian majority
– instead of switching data between the two columns. That is why his map shows
only 50–60% of Christians in Sofia, Kjustendil, Dupnitsa and Radomir, etc., and that is
why he used here rounded values. But if we take a closer look at the former, 1873
census, we may find that the data recorded in the Muslim column of the 1874
salname are indicated correctly in the Christian column (and the proportion of
Christians reaches 80–90%). This mistake also proves that Teplov did not have direct
access to the original Ottoman data.
36
37
Teplov’s map indicates only the male population, while the dataset using the Exarchate’s
data on the Bulgarian population refers to total numbers and uses ethnic categories (which
the map did not), and gives a kaza­level territorial breakdown.
A. Koyuncu, Osmanlı‐Rus Harbi, 197–198. Ethnic data from the conscription of the Exarchate
(1876/77). Bilal N. Şimşir, Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri, Vol 3, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara 1989.
and Nikolay Todorov, The Balkan City, 1400–1900, University of Washington Press, Seattle
& London 1983. The published data series in 1874 contain mistakes. Recalculated data in
brackets. For explanation, see text.
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Map 8. Part from Teplov’s choropleth map, with data inscriptions
It is evident that despite these mistakes, this data series of Teplov is more
appropriate than his data series which relies on the Exarchate’s data. In the latter
dataset, the numberand proportion of Muslims was too smallcompared to all other,
either western or Ottoman statistics, while huge masses of non­exarchist Christians
were indicated
as
unexplained. In other words, when submitting his map
to
the
conference, Teplov voted for the reliability of Ottoman data. Though the Exarchate’s
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data on Bulgarians maybe realistic (the number was not higher than given in Ottoman
sources: 1.05 million persons vs. 605 thousand males), in other aspects this “mixed”
statistics is not credible.
Conclusions
Our investigations proved that distortions with regard to the number and
proportion of Muslims and Christians appearing in Ottoman documents (long debated
by the then opposing parties and recent historiography too) were quite similar.
Neither group was over­ or underemphasized in the first censuses. Ottoman
ethnoreligious data should
be
considered reliable at least regarding percentage values
(absolute numbers showed great variety even within a small time­span and are
considered unreliable) as the comparison
of
the old Ottoman census and the
subsequent modern census carried out in the early 1870s according to the western
principles and methods proved it. While the methods of the census did change
significantly during the elapsed 40 years, the proportions did not – thus results are
independent from the applied method.The ethnoreligious picture obtained from the
earliest Ottoman censuses (1830s) is way better than the contemporary first­
generation western patch maps, created
by
Boué and Šafaryk (1840s). It is also
evident that these maps partly served Austrian political interests.38
We also proved that even Ottoman statistics were used in decision‐making, which
confirms that these were considered reliable by some of the contemporary political
observers, even if they served inimical powers (Russia). Teplov’s case also indicated
that Ottoman sources were accessible – though indirectly and with many mistakes –
for European scholars unable to read Osmanli, thus the thesis of McCarthy that they
usually neglected Ottoman data is not always true. On the other hand, the case of
Encyclopaedia Britannica also highlights that sometimes the incorrect data became
more widespread because of the greater “authority” of the publisher.
We also proved that there is a possibility to obtain reliable ethnic data from
different sources – even originating from opposing parties, by combining these
sources and cross­checking their reliability.
As
one would expect higher numbers for
Exarchists in an Exarchist census than in Ottoman (supposing tendentiousness and
partiality from both parties), the similarity of numbers in these documents implies
that the Exarchate’s data on the number of Bulgarians can be used for statistical
calculations (contrary to the Patriarchate’s data).That way at least the proportion of
Muslims and Exarchists can be verified for each district (however, this method does
still not enable us to handle other ethnic or religious categories).
38 Boué’s explorations were financed by the Austrians. See: Hugo Hassinger, Österreichs Anteil
an der Erforschung der Erde. Ein Beitrag zur Kulturgeschichte Österreichs, Wien 1949, Adolf
Holzhausen, 131. Boué’s and Šafaryk’s pro­Slavic map of the Balkans fitted into the scheme
of propagating Austro­Yugoslavism (Kopitar).
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We also proved that the patch­technique in the 19th century was intentionally
chosen as a method of illustration (the pie­chart technique was also known!), but
was not the best method to illustrate ethnic proportions and numbers. Therefore
early ethnic maps were more likely to serve political goals and were less of scientific
character. Ethnic maps based on language flattened identity and the picture they
suggested remarkably differed from ethnic maps based on other features of identity.39
39 This study was supported by the NKFIFK 128 978 project.
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IL RUOLO DELLA MAPPATURA ETNICA NELLA FORMAZIONE NAZIONALE
E LA SUA INFLUENZA SUL PROCESSO DECISIONALE POLITICO IN TUTTA LA
PENISOLA BALCANICA (DAL QUARTO DECENNIO DEL XIX SECOLO
AL PRIMO DECENNIO DEL XX SECOLO)
Riassunto
Oltre a sottolineare il ruolo e la funzione delle mappe etniche della penisola
balcanica nel XIX secolo, nel contesto di una nuova ideologia nazionalista, (1) questo
documento richiama l’attenzione su alcune interpretazioni errate o abusi intenzionali
dei cartografi, (2) sia confrontando gli insiemi dei dati autentici con le tabelle
ufficialmente pubblicate e reinterpretate, conservate presso l’Archivio di Stato
austriaco (HHStA) (2a), che confrontando pratiche cartografiche e metodi di
visualizzazione occidentali, orientali e balcanici (2b). Tutto ciò può portare a
interpretazioni differenti (per non parlare delle diverse interpretazioni dei termini che
denotano la stessa nazione), il che ha reso le mappe etniche un mezzo appropriato di
propagazione dell’idea nazionale. Invece di essere un metodo scientifico (mappatura
tematica), la cartografia è diventata uno strumento politico per creare la nazione
(invece di descriverla). Nei nostri casi di studio, esaminiamo (a) se le prime generazioni
di mappe etniche classiche rappresentavano meglio la situazione nei Balcani, o se lo
facevano meglio quelle modernee reinterpretate che visualizzavano la diversità etnica
con diagrammi a torta; (b) se i dati ottomani sono completamente inaffidabili o
possono servire come base per la mappatura etnica; (c) se i dati ottomani esaminati,
che abbiamo analizzato, degli anni ‘30 e ‘70 del XIX secolo fossero o meno disponibili
ai cartografi occidentali e come siano stati distorti; e (d) se c’erano delle mappe fatte
sulla base di dati ottomani pervenuti a quelli cheprendevano decisioni, ecome ciò era
correlato alla produzione di altre mappe occidentali. Confrontiamo anche le
caratteristiche della cartografia etnica nazionalista e imperialista, gli approcci basati
sulla lingua e sulla religione e le differenze tra questi approcci. Infine offriamo, pur
essendo limitato, un metodo di controllo incrociato sull’affidabilità di fonti delle parti
opposte (usando l’esempio dei dati ottomani e quelli degli esarcati).
Parole chiave: tecniche di mappatura etnica, Balcani, Ottomani, Esarcato, Kiepert,
Teplov, Bouè
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Габор ДЕМЕТЕР, Золт БОТЛИК, Кристиан КАПЛАР­ДЕГОВИЦ
УЛОГА ЕТНИЧКОГ МАПИРАЊА У ОБЛИКОВАЊУ НАЦИЈА И ЊЕН УТИЦАЈ
НА ДОНОШЕЊЕ ПОЛИТИЧКИХ ОДЛУКАШИРОМ БАЛКАНСКОГ ПОЛУОСТРВА
(ОД ЧЕТВРТЕ ДЕЦЕНИЈЕ 19. ВЕКА ДО ПРВЕ ДЕЦЕНИЈЕ 20. ВЕКА)
Резиме
поново
Поред указивања на улогуи функције етничких карата Балканског полуострва
у 19. веку, у контексту нове, националистичке идеологије, (1) овај рад скреће
пажњу на одређена погрешна тумачења или намерне злоупотребе картографа,
(2) упоређивањем изворних скуповаподатака са званично објављеними поново
протумаченим табелама које се чувају у Аустријском државном архиву (HHStA)
(2а), и поређењем западних и источних и балканских картографских пракси и
метода визуализације (2б). Све то може довести до различитих тумачења (да не
помињемо различита тумачења појмова за означавање исте нације), што
је
етничке мапе учинило одговарајућим средством за пропагирање националне
идеје, и уместо
да
буде научни метод (тематско мапирање), картографија
је
постала политичка алатка за стварање нације (уместо за њено описивање).
Нашим студијама случаја испитујемо (а)
да ли
су прве генерације класичних
етничких карата боље приказивале ситуацију на Балкану, или
протумачене модерне карте са кружним графиконима боље приказују етничку
разноликост; (б) да ли су османскиподаци сасвим непоузданиилимогу служити
као основ за етничко мапирање; (в) да ли су испитани османски подаци из ‘30­
их и ‘70­година 19. века били уопште доступни западним картографима или не,
и како су подаци искривљени; и (г)
да ли
је било карата урађених
на
основу
османских података које су дошле до доносилаца одлука и у каквој је вези то
било са израдом других, западних карата. Такође упоређујемо карактеристике
националистичкеи империјалистичке етничке картографије, приступе засноване
на
језику и религији и разлике између тих приступа и, напослетку, нудимо,
премда ограничен, метод узајамне провере поузданости извора супротста­
вљених страна (на примеру османских и егзархијских података).
Кључне речи: технике етничког мапирања, Балкан, Османлије, Егзархија,
Кијеперт, Теплов, Буе.
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